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ABSTRACT
Vulnerability and resilience to extreme weather hazards are a function of diverse physical, social, and
psychological factors. Previous research has focused on individual factors that influence public perceptions of
hazards, such as politics, ideology, and cultural worldviews, as well as on socioeconomic and demographic
factors that affect geographically based vulnerability, environmental justice, and community resilience. Few
studies have investigated individual socioeconomic and racial/ethnic differences in public risk perceptions of
the health hazards associated with extreme heat events, which are now increasing due to climate change. This
study uses multilevel statistical modeling to investigate individual- and geographic-level (e.g., census tract
level and regional) social, economic, and biophysical influences on public perceptions of the adverse health
impacts associated with heat waves. Political orientation and climate change beliefs are the strongest
predictors of heat wave health risk perceptions; household income also has a relatively strong and consistent
effect. Contextual socioeconomic vulnerability, measured with a social vulnerability index at the census tract
level, also significantly affects heat wave risk perceptions. The strong influence of political orientation
and climate beliefs on perceptions of adverse health impacts from heat waves suggests that ideological
predispositions can increase vulnerability to climate change.

1. Introduction
Heat is the leading cause of weather-related mortality
in the United States and is a hazard with which much of
the population has direct experience (Borden and
Cutter 2008). Recent research suggests that individuals
in areas of greater social vulnerability more often perceive heat wave health risks, holding constant political
attitudes and beliefs about climate change (Akerlof
et al. 2015). Heat is a health hazard that is expected to
increase in frequency and intensity as the climate continues to warm (IPCC 2014). Public perception of climate change, including the causes, consequences, and
associated risks to human health and well-being, has
been investigated across multiple social and behavioral
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science disciplines (Swim et al. 2009, 2011; Dunlap and
Brulle 2015). One of the persistent challenges, however,
has been to identify the effects (if any) that physical
changes to the environment (e.g., weather, plant and
animal life, pollution) and geographically based sociodemographic factors (e.g., geographically based social
vulnerability) have on public perceptions of climate
change and its consequences. To design more effective
communication strategies to reduce heat-related illness
and injury, it will be vital for local, regional, and national
organizations and agencies to develop a comprehensive
understanding of the factors that shape public perceptions of the health risks posed by heat waves.
A key hurdle in this challenge, however, is that
individual-level political attitudes and beliefs about environmental issues, such as climate change, may influence
risk perceptions as much or more than sociodemographic
and physical environmental factors, thus amplifying
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individuals’ vulnerabilities. Therefore, ideological predispositions and beliefs and attitudes about climate
change can be considered vulnerability factors alongside
sociodemographic vulnerability. This study combines insights from the literatures on social vulnerability and
public beliefs and attitudes about climate change in order
to investigate the individual- and geographic-level sociodemographic and biophysical factors that may influence
individuals’ perceptions of the health risks associated
with heat waves.
Part of the challenge in answering how environmental
changes might affect public perceptions of risks stems
from the diverse methodological approaches used by
various scientific disciplines and traditions attempting to
unpack this question. Social scientists have increasingly
turned to the integration of biophysical and social survey
data to include objective measures of environmental
phenomena, such as floods, temperature trends, and
other weather events, alongside individual-level sociodemographic predictors of public attitudes and perceptions (Egan and Mullin 2012; Goebbert et al. 2012;
Howe et al. 2013; Hamilton and Lemcke-Stampone
2014; Zaval et al. 2014; Hamilton et al. 2016; Shao
et al. 2017, 2018). In parallel, geographers have investigated the links between spatially concentrated
vulnerabilities (e.g., clustering of multiple socioeconomic disadvantages) at different geographic levels
(e.g., state, county, census tract, block group) and specific environmental hazards, in the case of floods, extreme heat, and disaster declarations (Cutter et al. 2003;
Johnson et al. 2012). As a result of largely nonoverlapping research aims, these different literatures
have left open questions that correspond with and could
potentially be answered by each other’s best insights.
For example, individual-level beliefs and attitudes are
embedded in geographically specific social and economic structures that condition their character to some
degree. Geographically based vulnerabilities (i.e., socioeconomic characteristics of communities at various
geographic levels such as census tracts or block groups)
may also condition individual-level perceptions of risks
due to increased exposure to hazards.
Specifically, this research explores four interrelated
questions about individuals’ perceptions of the risks
heat waves pose to their own health and the health of
others in their communities:
1) How might individuals’ political ideologies and beliefs
about the reality and causes of climate change influence their perceptions of the risks posed by heat waves
to themselves and others within their communities?
2) How might individual-level sociodemographic characteristics relate to individuals’ perceptions about
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the risks heat waves pose to their own health and the
health of those around them?
3) How might geographic-level socioeconomic characteristics influence such perceptions?
4) How might objectively measured exposure to local
heat waves influence such perceptions and net of
individual- and geographic-level social and economic
factors?

2. Literature review
a. Background
Recent research suggests that while the public is generally aware that climate change poses risks to human
health, this awareness lacks specificity and is relatively
shallow. A 2014 national survey compared respondents’
answers to both open- and closed-ended survey questions
about human health risks related to climate change and
found that although the majority of the public said climate change will be harmful to human health, only about
one-quarter were able to identify one or more specific
types of harm (Maibach et al. 2015). Perhaps more importantly, most Americans responded by saying they had
given little thought to the potential health consequences
of climate change (Leiserowitz et al. 2014), suggesting
that climate change impacts on local weather and extreme events have either not resonated with individuals in
their everyday lives, or the majority of communities in
America have simply not yet noticed the impacts of a
changing climate. Alternatively (or in addition), it could
be that Americans continue to see climate change as a
relatively distant threat that poses more harm to people in
developing nations or to future generations than to
themselves, to their family and friends, or to others in
their communities (Leiserowitz 2005; Akerlof et al. 2010;
Leiserowitz et al. 2017). Since most of the public does not
view climate change as a significant personal health risk,
climate-related hazards may pose an even greater health
threat in the near future if people inadequately prepare
for or respond to the increasing risks. A deeper understanding of the particular social factors that influence
public concern about heat wave health risks will be critical for organizations working to conduct effective communication campaigns to prevent or reduce heat-related
health impacts. Whether and to what extent individuals
perceive their own relative vulnerabilities is an important
factor for policymakers and organizations involved in
disaster preparation and response to consider.

b. Individual-level influences on risk perceptions
Though there has been much research on beliefs,
attitudes, and risk perceptions related to climate change,
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the majority of studies have focused on identifying and
explaining what Van Liere and Dunlap (1980) referred
to as the ‘‘social bases of environmental concern.’’ From
the ‘‘age, social class, residence, political, and sex hypotheses’’ (see Van Liere and Dunlap 1980) emerged
myriad studies over the following decades charting the
sociodemographic correlates of individual beliefs, attitudes, perceptions of risks, and norms of behavior with
respect to environmental issues and problems—most
notably, in recent years, the social and political dimensions of climate change beliefs. In addition to
individual-level sociodemographic indicators, some of
which are meant to capture individual-level vulnerability, this study also considers the influence of political
ideology and global warming beliefs on heat wave health
risk perceptions. Many studies have shown a consistent
and relatively strong effect of political views on beliefs
and concerns about environmental issues, especially the
issue of climate change (Leiserowitz 2005; Hamilton
2008; Hamilton et al. 2012; McCright 2011; McCright
et al. 2014; Marquart-Pyatt et al. 2014). Additionally,
beliefs about the reality and cause of climate change
have been shown to influence perceptions of local temperature and weather patterns (Cutler 2015, 2016; Howe
and Leiserowitz 2013; Howe 2018).
At the same time, a rich literature has emerged
demonstrating that racial and ethnic minorities are often
more vulnerable to environmental hazards (Bullard and
Johnson 2000; Cutter et al. 2003; Brulle and Pellow 2006;
Klinenberg 2015; Bolin and Kurtz 2018) and demonstrating individual and geographically based influences
on risk perceptions of hazards (e.g., White 1945; Kates
1962; Kasperson and Dow 1993; Slovic 1993; Hamilton
and Keim 2009; Marlon et al. 2018). There have been
relatively few studies, however, that focus on racial and
ethnic differences in heat wave risk perceptions as a
characteristic of individual-level vulnerability. More
broadly, there have been several studies documenting a
‘‘white male’’ and ‘‘conservative white male effect’’ of
relatively low-risk perceptions across a variety of hazards (Finucane et al. 2000; Kahan et al. 2007; McCright
and Dunlap 2013).
Among other sociodemographic correlates, older age
has been associated with increased risk for adverse
health consequences of extreme heat exposure, in addition to other hazards (Reid et al. 2009; Johnson et al.
2012; Klinenberg 2015; Gronlund et al. 2016). But risk
perception studies have not found older age to be associated with increased risk perceptions of climate
change (Leiserowitz 2006; Akerlof et al. 2015). While
age is a factor in vulnerability to heat, older people do
not appear to be more likely to view themselves as at
increased risk for heat-related health problems, perhaps
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in part because they often do not perceive themselves to
be ‘‘old’’ (Abrahamson et al. 2009). As referenced
above, men tend to have lower perceptions of risks associated with environmental hazards, but women also
tend to express greater concern about environmental
issues more generally (Dunlap and Van Liere 1984;
Stern et al. 1993; Stern and Dietz 1994; Dietz et al. 2005),
as well as the impacts of climate change specifically
(Hamilton 2008; Hamilton and Keim 2009; McCright
2010; Goebbert et al. 2012).
Educational attainment typically exerts a direct influence on concern about environmental issues, such
that more educated individuals tend to express greater
concerns or risk perceptions (Dunlap and Van Liere
1984; Jones and Dunlap 1992). Education and scientific
literacy, however, also interact with politics, such that
higher educational attainment among self-identified
Republicans or political conservatives corresponds to
lower perceived risks and less concern about environmental issues, which may indicate motivated reasoning
(Hamilton 2008; Hamilton et al. 2012; Hamilton and
Saito 2015; McCright and Dunlap 2011; McCright 2011;
Krosnick et al. 2000; Malka et al. 2009; Shao et al. 2014).
Finally, lower household income at the individual
level is associated with increased perceived local impacts of climate change and related environmental
phenomena (Hamilton and Keim 2009; Cutler 2015,
2016; Shao et al. 2016, 2014). In fact, recent research has
shown a multiplicative effect of household income and
local property damage from severe weather on perceptions of extreme weather events and the threat of climate change, such that individuals living in low-income
households in the most heavily impacted places express
greater awareness of and concern about personal risk
and property damage from severe weather events
(Cutler 2015, 2016). Income has often been incorporated
in broader indices intended to capture social vulnerability to environmental hazards, but such studies generally utilize geographically based measures of income,
such as median or per capita household income aggregated to subregion or substate geographic areas (Cutter
et al. 2003; Cutter and Finch 2008; Johnson et al. 2012;
Boruff et al. 2005; Wood et al. 2010). There have been
very few, if any, prior attempts to look at both individual
household income and broader geographical area income together in studies of perceptions of environmental hazards. The advantage of this approach is that it
can capture the possible effect of socioeconomic context
at the geographic level on individual-level perceptions
of vulnerability. Variables associated with social context
at the geographic level (i.e., employment structure,
community characteristics, levels of social trust and altruism) have been identified as important predictors of
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public beliefs, attitudes, and perceptions about social
and environmental issues (Hamilton et al. 2010; Safford
et al. 2012; Sampson 2012). This study addresses a critical gap in the literature by specifically investigating
whether geographically based socioeconomic context
matters to individual perceptions of personal and community vulnerability to heat waves, an increasingly important public health concern.

c. Geographic and biophysical influences on risk
perceptions
While much of the prior literature has focused on
individual-level factors as predictors of environmental attitudes and risk perceptions in general, less attention has
focused specifically on the socioeconomic and demographic
influences on heat wave risk perceptions, especially the
potential geographic-level socioeconomic factors that can
put some individuals in positions of increased risk for harm.
Perceptions are an important determinant of responses to
risks, so an improved understanding of the drivers of risk
perceptions can clarify how climate change impacts may
affect individuals and populations (Leiserowitz 2005;
Thomas et al. 2007; Whitmarsh 2008; Weber 2010; Wilhelmi
and Hayden 2010).
The human dynamics of hazards can be conceptualized through the lens of social vulnerability, which has
been defined as ‘‘. . .the sensitivity of a population to
natural hazards and its ability to respond to and recover
from the impacts of hazards’’ (Cutter and Finch 2008).
Using county-level socioeconomic and demographic
data, Cutter et al. (2003) constructed one of the first
comprehensive measures of social vulnerability to environmental hazards, the social vulnerability index
(SoVI). The SoVI combined factors related to personal
wealth, age, density of the built environment, singlesector economic dependence, housing stock and tenancy, race, ethnicity, occupation, and a hybrid construct
comprising employment in infrastructure and local debtto-revenue ratios (Cutter et al. 2003).
SoVI has since been utilized extensively to map and
analyze vulnerability at various scales and over various
periods of time (Boruff et al. 2005; Cutter et al. 2006;
Cutter and Emrich 2006; Boruff and Cutter 2007; Cutter
and Finch 2008; Wood et al. 2010) and has also been
adapted to include other measures of vulnerability, including actual heat exposure through the incorporation
of land surface temperature data (Johnson et al. 2012).
Reid et al. (2009) specifically mapped heat-related vulnerability (but not perceptions of vulnerability) in urban
census tracts across the United States using an approach
similar to Cutter et al. (2003); they identified four types
of vulnerability factors, including social/environmental
variables (e.g., education and poverty), social isolation,
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lack of air conditioning, and proportion of elderly with
diabetes.
While SoVI and related indicators have helped explain
geographic variation in environmental hazards vulnerability, they also have the potential to serve as important
predictors of perceptions of vulnerability to environmental hazards, especially heat waves. Where studies
have documented the link between actual and perceived
vulnerabilities, they have found that particularly vulnerable populations, such as racial and ethnic minorities, are
more likely to perceive risks from environmental hazards
(Akerlof et al. 2015). However, this link between perceived and actual vulnerabilities to environmental hazards has also been relatively underexplored (Brody et al.
2008; Wolf et al. 2010; Spence et al. 2011). Perceptions of
risks have been analyzed as correlates of personal values,
worldviews, and other culturally rooted cognitive processes at the individual level, but geographically based
factors and, specifically, social vulnerability have received
less attention, perhaps due to a lack of data availability at
various spatial and geographic units and/or because relevant
social-psychological theories of environmental attitudes and
risk perceptions tend to focus on individuals rather than
geographic areas as their units of analysis. Yet, individuallevel values are often embedded in geographically specific
contexts and connected to locally relevant phenomena,
such as cultural milieu, history, economic vibrancy, and
patterns of integration or segregation, among other factors
(Guagnano and Markee 1995; Kitchin et al. 1997; Lorenzoni
and Pidgeon 2006; Shwom et al. 2008; Hamilton and Keim
2009; Hamilton et al. 2010; Safford et al. 2012; Sampson
2012; Chuang et al. 2013; Hamilton and Safford 2015).
Local weather and climate—including temperature
and humidity—are another set of geographically based
factors that may influence heat wave health risk perceptions. Several recent studies document linkages between observational weather and climate data and
public perceptions of those events in the context of anthropogenic climate change. Using 2012 national survey
data, Howe et al. (2014) overlaid public perceptions and
reported personal experience with hurricanes, tornadoes, and drought onto maps of observed impacts from
each of the three event types and found that personal
experience corresponds well with the geographic distribution of reported impacts, particularly for hurricanes
and tornadoes.
Event trends have also been included in models predicting perceptions of weather events. Goebbert et al.
(2012) used trends in temperature and the Palmer drought
severity index (PDSI) by zip code with individual-level
sociodemographic information from a national survey to
analyze local climate perceptions. Perceptions of temperature were not significantly associated with actual changes
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in the weather, but respondents who lived in areas with
higher 3-yr-average departures in the PDSI from the 30-yr
average were more likely to perceive local flooding and
drought (Goebbert et al. 2012). Other research suggests
that trends in local temperatures, both in the United States
and cross nationally, correspond with perceptions of local
warming specifically (Hamilton and Keim 2009; Howe
et al. 2013; Howe and Leiserowitz 2013) and beliefs about
climate change more generally (Myers et al. 2013; Egan
and Mullin 2012; Hamilton and Stampone 2013; Hamilton
and Lemcke-Stampone 2014; Shao 2016; Shao et al. 2016).
Evidence for a recency bias has also been demonstrated
through research on perceptions of changes in hurricane
strength, consistent with research showing that recent experiences may be more influential to perceptions than
trends over time (Weber 2010; Shao et al. 2016).
There have also been efforts to incorporate data on
weather extremes in studies of public perceptions of
weather events and climate change, but little consensus
has been achieved as to which events affect perceptions
most or which measures are most useful. Brody et al.
(2008) examined several different factors related to extreme weather vulnerabilities, including economic and
property damages, injuries, fatalities, and fires, and found
that the number of fatalities and economic damages in
excess of $1 billion was associated with perceptions of
personal and local risks from climate change. Yet,
Marquart-Pyatt et al. (2014) used the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) Climate
Extremes Index (CEI) and found that the regional-level
measure did not significantly predict public beliefs about
the seriousness and timing of climate change impacts net
of political identity and other sociodemographic factors.
Similarly, Brulle et al. (2012) did not find any significant
relationship between NOAA’s CEI at the national level
and a ‘‘climate change threat index’’ constructed from
multiple survey items intended to measure aggregate U.S.
national opinion about the threat posed by climate
change. Shao and Goidel (2016) also demonstrated that
political orientation is the primary driver of perceptions
of local weather conditions, and in turn, those perceptions
overshadow objective weather conditions in influencing
attitudes about climate. While studies utilizing survey
research on public opinion about climate change have
often included biophysical factors, many lack finescale
geographic data to identify specific impacts within respondents’ own areas. A key component missing from all
of these studies is a focus on public perceptions of the
health risks associated with climate and weather extremes, especially in the context of social and physical
vulnerabilities.
This research investigates four interrelated hypotheses
based on the theoretical insights from the prior literature on
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climate change risk perceptions and the geographically
varying social and physical conditions related to environmental hazards vulnerabilities. First, we expect individual
ideological orientations and beliefs about climate change to
exert the largest influence over perceptions of the health
risks associated with heat waves, such that conservatives
who are skeptical about the reality and cause of climate
change will be much less likely to perceive health risks from
heat waves than liberals who believe climate change is real
and human caused. Second, we expect that individual-level
socioeconomic factors, such as race/ethnicity, income, age,
and gender, will all exert significant influences on heat wave
health risk perceptions net of ideological factors. Third, we
expect that geographically based socioeconomic factors
associated with hazards vulnerability will exert some level
of influence on individual-level risk perceptions, such that
those living in more socioeconomically vulnerable places
will perceive greater risks from heat waves. Finally, we
expect to find a relationship between observed heat conditions and perceptions of risks, such that those living in
areas more heavily impacted by extreme heat conditions
will be more likely to perceive health risks and net of social
and ideological factors.

3. Methods
a. Sample
This study utilizes two waves of the biannual, nationally representative Climate Change in the American
Mind (CCAM) surveys, conducted by the Yale Program
on Climate Change Communication and the Center for
Climate Change Communication at George Mason
University. The CCAM surveys have tracked public
beliefs and attitudes about climate change and a wide
range of associated issues and topical areas, such as risk
perceptions, media consumption habits, policy preferences, and many others (Leiserowitz et al. 2018). There
have been 18 waves of CCAM data collected since fall
2008. While some items have been tracked throughout
CCAM’s deployment, most survey questions have been
asked more selectively. This research uses two of the 18
waves wherein the survey items that serve as the dependent variables were assessed. Descriptive information, including sample size and data collection dates, for
each wave is provided in Table 1. Samples were drawn
from GfK’s KnowledgePanel, an online panel of members recruited using probability sampling via random
digit dialing and address-based mail techniques that
cover essentially all resident phone numbers and mail
addresses in the United States. Survey questionnaires
were self-administered by respondents through a webbased environment. Those sampled who chose to join
the panel but did not have access to the internet at home
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TABLE 1. Independent variables from CCAM surveys.
Variable
Age
Gender
Education
Household income

Race/ethnicity

Ideology

Global warming belief

Census division

Survey wave

Range
Individual-level characteristics
1 (18–29), 2 (30–44), 3 (45–59), 4 (601)
0 (male), 1 (female)
1 (,high school), 2 (high school), 3
(some college), 4 (Bachelor’s or higher)
1 (,$25,000), 2 ($25,000–$34,999), 3
($35,000–$49,999), 4 ($50,000–$74,999),
5 ($75,000–$99,999), 6 ($100,0001)
1 (white, non-Hispanic), 2 (Hispanic),
3 (African American, non-Hispanic),
4 (other/multiracial)
1 (very liberal), 2 (somewhat liberal),
3 (moderate), 4 (somewhat
conservative), 5 (very conservative)
1 (human caused–reference category),
2 (natural), 3 (not happening),
4 (other belief/do not know)
Census division and CCAM survey wave
1 (New England), 2 (Mid-Atlantic),
3 (East-North Central), 4 (West-North
Central), 5 (South Atlantic), 6
(East-South Central), 7 (West-South
Central), 8 (Mountain), 9 (Pacific)
0 (Nov 2016), 1 (Oct 2015)

were loaned personal computers and provided with internet
access in order to participate so that the web-based design
would not systematically exclude certain segments of the
population. Postsurvey weights were applied to demographic
variables to match the U.S. Census Bureau’s norms.

b. Dependent variables
This study analyzes individuals’ perceptions of the
impacts that a heat wave would have on their own personal health and the health of those in their communities. The dependent variables were constructed from
two survey questions aimed at assessing respondents’
perceptions about the extent to which a heat wave would
have an impact on their own personal health or the
health of those within their communities. These survey
questions,1 assessed in the October 2015 (n 5 1344) and
November 2016 (n 5 1226) CCAM surveys, included a
brief preface, ‘‘A heat wave is a period of unusually and
uncomfortably hot weather,’’ and then proceeded to ask
respondents, ‘‘If a heat wave were to occur in your local
area, how much, if at all, do you think it would harm the
following,’’ with reference to their own personal health

1
The survey questions on risks of harm from heat waves came
before the suite of questions on climate change beliefs and attitudes, thus eliminating the possibility of biasing responses in one
direction.

Mean (standard deviation)

N

2.856 (1.072)
0.517 (0.500)
2.933 (0.968)

2556
2556
2556

3.985 (1.786)

2556

—

2556

3.129 (1.075)

2525

—

2555

—

2556

0.520 (0.500)

2556

and the health of others in their communities. Respondents were not provided with any higher level of
specificity regarding how long the ‘‘period of unusually
and uncomfortably hot weather’’ referred to, in part
because subjective experience of heat waves may differ
from technical definitions provided by agencies monitoring such events. Respondents were provided a slider
bar with values on a scale from 0 to 100 and asked to use
the slider to indicate ‘‘how much’’ a heat wave would
impact each. The October 2015 and November 2016
waves of CCAM were the first in which these two items
had been assessed.2

c. Independent variables and individual-level
vulnerability
Independent variables at the individual level included
diverse sociodemographic indicators, respondents’ beliefs about global warming, and ideological identification. Census division of residence (based on the nine
Census divisions3) and an indicator of survey wave

2
Given that these surveys were the first time these items had
been assessed, no prior knowledge had been generated about how
individuals would tend to respond to the scale and slider bar format
presented for this particular pair of questions.
3
https://www2.census.gov/geo/pdfs/maps-data/maps/reference/
us_regdiv.pdf.
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TABLE 2. Geographically based vulnerability: 2014 ACS 5-yr census tract estimates.

Variable

Range

Mean (standard deviation)

N

Percent nonwhite
Percent less than high school education
Median age
Median household income
Percent below poverty
Percent Hispanic
Population density
Unemployment rate

0–100
0–100
15.8–78.2
$3,576–$108,472
0–100
0–100
0–154 454.9
0–100

20.23 (21.21)
15.20 (11.61)
39.14 (7.23)
$30,809.61 ($11,862.11)
14.06 (11.33)
14.45 (19.16)
4486.36 (10 888.63)
8.90 (5.55)

2544
2539
2542
2542
2543
2544
2545
2542

participation were also included to account for spatial and
temporal variability among survey respondents. All independent variables derived from CCAM survey data are
described in Table 1. A categorical indicator for racial and
ethnic identities was created from a five-category nominal
variable that reported respondents’ race or ethnicity. In
addition to race and ethnicity, other sociodemographic
indicators at the individual level included respondents’
age, gender, education, and household income.
Finally, among individual-level predictors, this analysis included individuals’ self-reported political ideology
and beliefs about the reality and cause of global warming. Political ideology is treated as a five-category ordinal measure, from ‘‘very liberal’’ to ‘‘very conservative.’’
The variable used to indicate global warming beliefs was
derived from an original survey item that asked respondents whether they believed global warming is
mostly due to 1) human causes, 2) natural changes in the
environment, 3) neither because it is not happening, or
4) respondents could indicate that they were either unsure or had another belief about the cause of global
warming. Human causation was treated as the reference
category in the four-category nominal variable used in
statistical models because initial bivariate analysis revealed this response option to have the greatest positive
correlation with responses to the dependent variable,
thus facilitating interpretation of the results.

d. Geographically based vulnerability
To capture the possible influence of geographically
based social vulnerability on perceptions of heat wave
risks, a proxy measure of vulnerability was utilized informed by the prior literature on SoVI and related indices (Cutter et al. 2003, 2008, 2010; Johnson et al. 2012;
Schmidtlein et al. 2008). The variables used to construct
the measure were derived from the 2014 American
Community Survey’s (ACS) 5-yr census tract estimates.
These census tract data were matched to survey respondents utilizing jittered (6150 m) coordinates for
respondents’ household addresses. The ACS variables
used to construct this measure included the percentage
of nonwhite residents, the percentage of residents with

less than a high school education, median age, median
household income, the percentage of residents below
the federal poverty line, the percentage of Hispanic
residents, population density, and the unemployment
rate. The choice of this set of variables was primarily
informed by Johnson et al.’s (2012, p. 25) extreme heat
vulnerability index (EHVI). The sociodemographic
variables utilized in our proxy measure cover the major
components of EHVI, which accounted for about 73%
of explained variance and included age, race/ethnicity,
household income, education, and population density
(Johnson et al. 2012). Table 2 displays descriptive information for each of the variables used to construct this
proxy measure of heat vulnerability. Not only do these
cover the major components of prior indices, including
racial and ethnic composition, age structure, urban
density, and socioeconomic status, but these variables
are also considered among the most ‘‘prevalent indicators of vulnerability’’ in the context of extreme heat
(Johnson et al. 2012). Standard scores (Z scores) were
calculated for each variable prior to inclusion, and the
entire set of Z scores was summed to produce a single
measure for each respondents’ census tract. The Cronbach’s alpha for the scale was 0.74, indicating a sufficient
degree of internal reliability. While Cronbach’s alpha
does not test for dimensionality as principal components analysis does, this set of variables was previously
determined to represent three highly intercorrelated
components of an index of extreme heat vulnerability
(Johnson et al. 2012). A Cronbach’s alpha of 0.74 is
generally considered a high-degree shared covariance
and likely demonstrates that this proxy measure indicates an underlying construct: geographically based
social vulnerability.

e. Biophysical variables
Biophysical variables included in this study came from
two derived measures of heat incidence and intensity: 1)
cooling degree-days (CDD) and 2) the heat stress index
(HSI). Data on CDD were obtained from NOAA’s
Climate Prediction Center (CPC). These data are provided at the level of the climate division, a substate
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TABLE 3. NWS cooling degree-days (CDDs) and heat stress index (HSI).
Variable
2015 CDD total
2015 CDD anomaly
2016 CDD total
2016 CDD anomaly

Range
May–Sep CDDs
85–2757
2484.61–319.82
49–2817
2456.61–550.70

Mean (standard deviation)

N

1186.76 (692.83)
69.60 (125.67)
1316.13 (692.42)
188.83 (135.45)

1321
1321
1210
1210

23.29 (13.14)
7.11 (10.84)
28.82 (13.37)
12.39 (11.17)

1330
1330
1226
1226

May–Sep HSI
2015 HSI total
2015 HSI anomaly
2016 HSI total
2016 HSI anomaly

0–65
227.64–37
0–77
227.64–55.06

geographic area. Descriptive statistics for the biophysical
variables are provided in Table 3. There are 344 climate
divisions in the United States. Monthly temperature and
precipitation values are computed from daily station observations in each division. According to NOAA’s CPC,
CDD are defined as ‘‘a quantitative index demonstrated to
reflect demand for energy to. . . cool houses and businesses’’
and are the summation of positive differences between the
mean daily temperature and a base of 658F. To illustrate
how these data might look, the CPC provides the example
that ‘‘cooling degree days for a station with daily mean
temperatures during a 7-day period of 67, 65, 70, 74, 78, 65,
and 68 are 2, 0, 5, 9, 13, 0, and 3, for a total for the week of 32
cooling degree days.’’4 The CPC estimates degree-days for
substate climate divisions and applies population weights to
accurately estimate temperature-related energy consumption. The total CDD from the period of May–September
prior to their survey completion date were merged with
survey data according to each respondent’s climate division. The warmest months were selected in order to
control for the seasonal variability across the country that
could lead to inflated estimates for portions of the country
that experience warmth well before or after the summer
months. To also capture the potentially important influence
of abnormal May–September CDD, anomalies were calculated as the departure of the total CDD from the 1981–
2013 averages by climate division for each respondent.
In addition to a measure of temperature-related energy use in warm months, this study incorporates a
measure of apparent ambient temperature, or ‘‘how
hot it feels’’ based on both temperature and humidity.
The National Centers for Environmental Information
(NCEI) at NOAA calculate an HSI using data on temperature and humidity from hourly observations by the
187 National Weather Service (NWS) stations across the

4
http://www.cpc.ncep.noaa.gov/products/analysis_monitoring/
cdus/degree_days/ddayexp.shtml.

nation. These data are provided in the form of the average single-day exceedances above the 85th percentile
per month.5 In a similar fashion to the CDD, survey
respondents were matched with the HSI for their local
climate division for the months of May–September
preceding the survey date. Anomalies were calculated
to capture the departure from the 1981–2013 average
HSI and included in statistical models.
While a number of recent studies suggest a link between
temperature and weather and beliefs about climate change
(e.g., Howe et al. 2014; Cutler 2016; Shao et al. 2016), other
recent studies using measures of temperature trends,
flooding events, and climate extremes do not find that such
event types significantly predict public perceptions and
beliefs about climate-related phenomena (Brody et al.
2008; Goebbert et al. 2012; Hamilton et al. 2016; MarquartPyatt et al. 2014). The novel approach of this study,
however, is to use CDD and HSI as measures of the
‘‘felt impacts’’ of rising temperatures. Since CDDs are
computed in reference to the point at which most people
turn on air conditioning, fans, or other energy-consumptive
cooling methods, higher average CDDs may capture the
human impact of heat better than raw temperatures or
anomalies. Likewise, HSI accounts for differences in humidity that affect how hot it feels, adding information to
the absolute temperatures alone.

f. Analytical strategy
The distribution of responses on the continuous 0–100
scale was multimodal, with substantial proportions of
responses clustered below 20, between 20 and 40, between 40 and 60, and above 60. Therefore, the dependent variable was treated as ordered categorical, and
ordered logistic regression was used to analyze the
individual-level and geographically based influences on
the outcome variable. This analytical choice may be

5

https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/societal-impacts/heat-stress/data.
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TABLE 4. Mixed-effects ordered logistic regressions of perceived health risks of heat waves on individual- and geographic-level characteristics (pooled Oct 2015 and Nov 2016 CCAM surveys). Significance level: * is p , 0.05, ** is p , 0.01, *** is p , 0.001.

Independent variables
Individual characteristics
Age
Gender (female)
Education
Household income
Ideology (very liberal–very conservative)
Oct 2015
White, non-Hispanic
Hispanic
African American
Other race/multiracial
Global warming belief (Human)
Natural
Not happening
Do not know
Census division
Place characteristics
Vulnerability index
May–Sep 2015/16 CDD
May–Sep 2015/16 CDD anomaly
May–Sep 2015/16 HSI
May–Sep 2015/16 HSI anomaly
Random intercept
Climate division
N
Cut 1/Cut 2/Cut 3
Wald chi2

Model 1: ‘‘My health’’

Model 2: ‘‘Health of others in my
community’’

Odds ratios (95% confidence)

Odds ratio (95% confidence)

1.170*** (1.092–1.254)
1.189* (1.025–1.379)
0.821*** (0.755–0.893)
0.876*** (0.836–0.917)
0.890** (0.823–0.961)
1.735*** (1.463–2.056)

1.138*** (1.057–1.214)
1.310*** (1.133–1.515)
0.914* (0.839–0.994)
0.931** (0.890–0.975)
0.826*** (0.765–0.892)
1.079 (0.915–1.272)

1.309* (1.032–1.662)
1.406** (1.084–1.825)
1.984*** (1.465–2.686)

1.150 (0.885–1.493)
1.169 (0.874–1.565)
1.507** (1.114–2.040)

0.624*** (0.526–0.740)
0.281*** (0.203–0.390)
0.418** (0.220–0.795)
ns

0.521*** (0.440–0.617)
0.235*** (0.170–0.326)
0.351** (0.180–0.684)
ns

1.028* (1.002–1.055)
1.000 (1.000–1.000)
1.000 (0.999–1.001)
0.994 (0.973–1.017)
1.016 (0.990–1.043)

1.031* (1.005–1.059)
1.000 (1.000–1.000)
1.000 (0.999–1.001)
0.998 (0.979–1.017)
1.006 (0.983–1.029)

0.038
2477
21.457/20.200/1.092
307.96***

0.000
2477
22.280/20.759/0.830
279.76***

limited in that it reduces the variability of responses to
the dependent variable and may lose important information as a result, but given that roughly 20%–25%
of respondents fell into each quarter of the 0–100 scale, it
was more appropriate to treat the variable as ordinal.
Since geographic predictor variables are included in
these statistical models, and survey responses may be
spatially autocorrelated, the ordered logistic regressions
were constructed as multilevel, mixed-effects models
with climate division set as a second-level random effect.

4. Findings
Results from weighted, mixed-effects ordered logistic
regressions of the individual- and geographic-level predictors on the dependent variables are reported in Table 4.
Odds ratios reported are in reference to 1.0, where
positive effects are above 1.0, and negative effects are
below 1.0. Positive odds ratios in Table 4 refer to the
multiplicative effects on the odds of a ‘‘60–100’’ response on the heat wave harm slider bar for a unit increase in the predictor versus the lower three ordered
categories of possible responses, ‘‘0–20,’’ ‘‘20–40,’’ or

‘‘40–60,’’ whereas negative ratios refer to the multiplicative effects on the odds of a ‘‘0–20’’ response versus
the combined ‘‘20–40,’’ ‘‘40–60,’’ and ‘‘60–100’’ categories. Indirect effects between all geographic- and
individual-level variables were tested using a stepwise
procedure and through the creation of interaction terms,
but we did not find any significant results to indicate
mediating or moderating influences of independent
variables on the dependent variable. Therefore, results
presented in Table 4 include only direct effects.
As hypothesized, political ideology and beliefs about
global warming each consistently predict respondents’
perceptions of the health risks from future heat waves.
Conservatives perceive personal or community health
risks from heat waves much less often than liberals. The
odds of ‘‘60–100’’ responses on the heat wave harm
slider bars for personal or community health were 11%
and 16% lower, respectively, with a unit increase in the
ideology indicator. Beliefs about global warming also
significantly predict heat wave health risk perceptions.
Belief in any cause other than the human causation of
global warming—including that global warming is a
natural phenomenon, that it is not happening at all, or
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FIG. 1. Predicted individual perceptions of personal health risks of
heat waves by geographic-level vulnerability.

being unsure or having any other unclassified viewpoint—results in much lower odds of reporting harm
from heat waves to personal or community health. The
belief that human-caused global warming is not happening, however, produces a much stronger negative
effect on the odds of perceiving heat wave harm to either
personal or community health. For example, the odds
of a ‘‘60–100’’ response on the slider bars indicating
harm to personal and community health are 72% and
74% lower, respectively, among those who believe
global warming is not happening at all versus happening
due to human causes, whereas the odds are 37% and
47% lower, respectively, among those who believe
global warming is happening, but due to natural causes
versus human causes.
In a similar fashion to ideology and global warming
beliefs, we did find evidence for the second hypothesized
relationship between individual-level sociodemographic
factors and perceptions of heat wave health risks.
Individual-level household incomes significantly predict
perceptions of the risks posed by future heat waves net of
other individual- and geographic-level variables. The
odds of a ‘‘60–100’’ response on the slider bar to personal
and community health decline by 12% and 7%, respectively, for a single-unit increase in the six-point
household income indicator. For example, the odds of a
‘‘heat wave would cause harm to my personal health’’
response are 47% lower among individuals in households
with incomes greater than $100,000 (U.S. dollars) annually (0.885 5 0.53), compared to all other household income categories in the six-point scale and controlling for
other variables. Thus, while ideological predispositions
are persistent and relatively strong predictors of perceived harm from heat waves, individual-level vulnerability as measured through household income is also
important. Educational attainment, another component
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of socioeconomic status, is a significant predictor for
personal health risk perceptions. The odds of a ‘‘heat
wave would cause harm’’ response or a ‘‘60–100’’ response on the harm slider bar are 16% and 18% lower,
respectively, for a unit increase in the four-point educational attainment indicator.
Respondents’ age and racial/ethnic identities also
predict perceptions of heat wave health risks. The odds
of a ‘‘60–100’’ response on the harm slider bars for
personal and community health increase by 17% and
14%, respectively, with a single-unit increase in the fourcategory age indicator. Racial and ethnic identities, on
the other hand, have a more complex relationship to
heat wave health risk perceptions. In general, nonwhite
respondents are more likely than white respondents to
perceive heat waves as a personal health risk, but community health risk perceptions are higher only among
‘‘other’’ (any race/ethnicity other than white, African
American, or Hispanic) or multiracial respondents.
Among the hypothesized geographically based predictors, only socioeconomic vulnerability significantly
predicts perceptions of heat wave health risks. Predicted
values for personal health risk perceptions are plotted
against the mean vulnerability score in Fig. 1. As reported in Table 1, the odds of responding ‘‘60–100’’ on
the slider bar for both personal and community health
risks increase by 3% with a single-point increase in the
vulnerability index, holding all other individual- and
geographic-level predictors constant. On the other
hand, none of the measures of ‘‘felt impacts’’ from recent heat events, both total CDD or HSI and CDD or
HSI anomalies, had a direct influence over respondents’
perceptions of heat wave health risks. There are significant temporal effects, however, as indicated by the
variables for survey wave participation. For both personal and community health risk perceptions, survey
participation in the month of October versus November
increases the odds of perceived health risks from heat
waves. Thus, there may be a recency effect of summer
heat on perceptions of heat waves. Finally, the random
effect of climate division is not significantly predictive of
heat wave health risk perceptions in any of the models
tested. While it is not a significant predictor, the inclusion of climate division as a level in a multilevel
model did help to ensure that the effects from the geographically based CDD and HSI variables, as well as the
vulnerability indices, were not biased due to latent
spatial clustering of similar responses. Latent spatial
clustering in this context refers to the likelihood that
individuals in close spatial proximity to each other may
tend to respond in similar fashion—a phenomenon also
referred to as positive spatial autocorrelation. This can
be a problem in prediction models because observations
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are assumed to be independent from one another, and
the presence of positive spatial autocorrelation would
violate this assumption. Finally, none of the nine Census
division dummy variables (simply denoted as ‘‘ns’’ in
Table 4 to reduce the visual complexity) predict risk
perceptions, and this corresponds with the lack of a
second-level effect in climate division as well.

5. Discussion
This study contributes to the literature on public climate
change and heat wave risk perceptions by integrating
individual-level survey data with geographic-level biophysical and social vulnerability data to better understand
the combined influences of social, geographic, and physical factors on individuals’ perceptions of heat waves. Prior
studies have typically taken only one of these approaches,
examining sociodemographic predictors alone, combining
biophysical and survey data, or investigating the extent of
social vulnerability to environmental hazards (Van Liere
and Dunlap 1980; Cutter et al. 2003; Hamilton and Keim
2009; Howe et al. 2014; Cutler 2015). This study combines
insights from all three approaches to compare and contrast these different influences on public perceptions
about the health risks of heat waves. We found that global
warming beliefs and political and ideological factors, as
well as individual- and geographic-level socioeconomic
vulnerabilities, influence individuals’ perceptions about
the health risks posed by heat waves to themselves and
others in their communities.
This study also provides new evidence that climate
change concern is related to risk perceptions of related
phenomena such as heat waves. This is an important
finding because it suggests that the experience of heat
wave events can be interpreted through individuals’
ideological lenses. Although previous research has highlighted the importance influences of political orientation
on climate change risk perceptions (e.g., Hamilton 2011;
McCright and Dunlap 2011), this analysis shows that extreme heat events may also become politicized phenomena, affecting individuals’ assessments of their own
vulnerability to heat. If true, this dynamic should inform
efforts to promote awareness about the health consequences of prolonged heat exposure.
The importance of multiple indicators of vulnerability,
including household income, educational attainment, racial and ethnic background, and age—all at the individual
level—as well as measures of hazards and social vulnerability at the census tract level, in predicting individuals’
perceptions of the health risks posed by heat waves to
themselves and others in their communities is consistent
with the extant literature (Akerlof et al. 2010, 2015;
Maibach et al. 2015; Cutler 2016). Individuals living in
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households with higher incomes perceive less risk from
future heat waves, suggesting that higher-income households have greater ability to protect against heat wave
events, such as the ability to afford energy-intensive air
conditioning over several days, or even having the ability
to purchase such appliances or afford homes with air
conditioning in the first place (Reid et al. 2009).
Interestingly, income predicts both perceived personal and community health risks, suggesting that
household income to some extent also captures residential segregation based on socioeconomic status. In
other words, individuals tend to live in neighborhoods
alongside others with similar income levels to their own,
thus precipitating a feeling of shared context, whether
that context is one of relative risk or security. The significant influence of the index of geographically based
socioeconomic vulnerability provides additional evidence that perceptions of vulnerability to climaterelated hazards are ‘‘emplaced’’ (Gieryn 2000) along
with other related concentrated social inequalities, such
as income, wealth, deviance, and other geographically
relevant social phenomena. In demonstrating a link
between geographically based vulnerability and perceptions of heat wave health risks, this study contributes
to a growing body of scholarship about the relationship
between characteristics of ‘‘place,’’ or geography, and
perceived environmental changes, risks, and hazards
(Hamilton and Keim 2009; Howe et al. 2013; Goebbert
et al. 2012; Howe and Leiserowitz 2013; Howe et al.
2014; Cutler 2016; Shao et al. 2016). Income and education are generally highly correlated at individual and
area levels, so it is not surprising that the effect of
individual-level educational attainment also significantly predicts perceptions of health risks associated
with heat waves. Individuals with lower levels of educational attainment more often perceive risks to their
own health and the health of others within their communities from future heat waves. Individuals with higher
educational attainment are more likely to work in professional or managerial occupations that do not require
them to labor outdoors during extreme heat.
Other potential vulnerabilities such as racial and ethnic
background and age that often predict environmental risk
perceptions (Klineberg et al. 1998; Greenberg 2005;
Akerlof et al. 2015) are significant though less-consistent
predictors of risk perceptions. Hispanic and African
American respondents are more likely to perceive heat
wave health risks to themselves, but not for risks to others
in their communities, as compared to white respondents.
More reliably, those who identify with any other racial or
ethnic background, or two or more racial categories,
much more often perceive personal health risks of
heat waves for both themselves and others in their
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communities. While this research is unable to disaggregate the ‘‘other’’ racial category, these findings suggest a
potentially important new avenue for future research
with respect to racial and ethnic differences in the perceptions of risks associated with climate change. Racial
and ethnic differences in heat wave perceptions require a
deeper investigation than this study is able to provide.
Prior research has demonstrated that race and ethnicity
matter in terms of vulnerabilities to environmental hazards (Brulle and Pellow 2006; Cutter et al. 2006), but it is
less clear how perceptions are shaped within these more
vulnerable racial and ethnic minority communities.
While individual-level socioeconomic characteristics
predict heat wave health risk perceptions, especially
household income, geographically based socioeconomic
characteristics also predict individual risk perceptions.
Individuals living in census tracts with higher social
vulnerability more often perceive health risks to themselves and others in their communities. Not only do individuals who are more socioeconomically vulnerable as
indicated by their own incomes perceive more risk to
themselves and others in their communities, but the
socioeconomic status of those surrounding them also
appears to influence their perceptions of these vulnerabilities. This finding indicates that risk perceptions are
influenced not just by individual-level, social-psychological
processes, but also broader, macrolevel processes involving neighborhood- or community-level dynamics,
such as socioeconomic circumstances. Whereas prior
research has either assessed aggregate social vulnerabilities of geographic areas to environmental hazards
(e.g., Reid et al. 2009) or the effect of individual-level
vulnerabilities on risk perceptions (e.g., Bord and
O’Connor 1997), this study illustrates the importance of
both micro- and macrolevel vulnerabilities.
The results regarding vulnerability and risk perceptions also have important implications for communication and public health campaigns aimed at reducing
heat-related mortality and illnesses. In their review of
NOAA NWS extreme heat warnings methods, Hawkins
et al. (2017) find that weather forecasters often report
confusion from the inconsistent heat products from
NWS and inflexibility with respect to local conditions
and impacts. However, given regional variability of climate and the heterogeneity of social, environmental,
and infrastructural circumstances across the United
States, Hawkins and colleagues note that a national
standardization of heat warnings and communications
would be ‘‘unfeasible and inappropriate’’ (Hawkins
et al. 2017). They do note, however, that the NWS has
undertaken efforts to collaborate with local health departments and officials to emphasize important heatrelated health issues and local context (i.e., urban heat

VOLUME 10

island effect) in extreme heat warnings to the general
public. The results of our study have implications for
efforts such as these by policy makers and stakeholders
who are concerned with the public health risks of heat
waves. Evidence from our study can be used to inform
policy approaches to the communication of heat hazards, specifically that communication strategies should
take into consideration the role of individual- and geographically based vulnerabilities, as well as political attitudes about heat and climate change, in shaping
perceptions of heat wave health impacts. These insights
can help improve the design of communication strategies to increase awareness about the health consequences of heat exposure.
In addition to the consideration of political ideology,
climate change beliefs, and social and economic vulnerability, this study incorporated multiple measures of
what might be considered the ‘‘felt impacts’’ of heat or
heat wave events. By geolocating survey respondents
and integrating CDD and HSI data into statistical
models as fixed effects of heat incidence and severity,
this study assessed the extent to which the direct, experienced impacts of extreme heat might influence individuals’ evaluations of the health risks. Contrary to the
fourth hypothesized relationship, no evidence of a direct
link between these measures of the felt impacts of heat
and perceptions of heat wave health risks was found.
The lack of any influence on risk perceptions from
measures of actual exposure underscores the need for
more research on the most appropriate measures of
exposure to weather events and other climate-related
phenomena. It may be the case that certain physical
environmental indicators can illuminate how individuals
experience such phenomena, but it may also be possible
that such an effect cannot be reliably captured by any
particular measure of climate-related impacts, and as
such a more comprehensive index of multiple indicators
might be worth exploring. It may also be the case that
our measures of ‘‘felt impacts’’ do not account for possible individual-level variability that could be captured
by measures at higher resolutions (e.g., more localized
effects than the climate division is able to provide).
Additionally, more in-depth survey work, or perhaps
ethnographic field work and case studies, could identify
cultural or other geographically dependent social indicators of risk perceptions. Alternatively, such work
could also uncover important geographically specific,
sociocultural, and economic factors that constrain risk
perceptions among individuals living in the warmest
parts of the South, Midwest, or West, or perhaps in the
Northeast, where the greatest mismatch between perceptions and actual incidence of heat events may soon
develop due to a changing climate.

OCTOBER 2018

CUTLER ET AL.

This study provides evidence that Americans’ perceptions of heat wave risks are substantially shaped by
ideological predispositions and beliefs about the reality
of global warming but are also linked to their own personal socioeconomic characteristics and the socioeconomic structure of the places in which they live. As the
climate changes and the impacts of severe weatherrelated events increase, ideological influences and socioeconomic vulnerabilities will be crucial to understand
in order to develop the most effective communication
strategies about the risks posed by a warming planet.
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